But they can be cloned to a software emulator for dongles! I was once asked, back in 2003, to evaluate a Software protection dongle to see if we could use it to protect our own software so customers who bought it could not make illegal copies. That was the HASP key, which is now known as the Sentinel dongle. Clone software protection dongle. Photo by Patrick Hendry on Unsplash. A year ago, I bought software (with a license!) that needs a USB dongle to work. It is really cumbersome to have that dongle with you at all time. 2020-7-8 With your Safenet Sentinel Dongle Emulator Clone Crack you will obtain a Sentinel SuperPro hardware key, the Sentinel SuperPro Developers Toolkit, utilities, API’s, libraries and pattern code. 2020-8-19 McAMOS SmartLock Dongle Details It is a usb software protection lock developed by the engineers of McAmos Taiwan, targeting the companies that produce cheap software. There are 4 models, these are G2, Linux, NETUSB, and standard USB. These locks are not used by the driver. 2019-9-4 A Dongle or security key can be USB or HDMI type. Steps to clone a USB Dongle and overcome the protection of a program There are several methods to make a copy or clone a Dongle, some only work on computers with Windows operating systems, from Windows XP to Windows 10. This method performs a complete emulation of the Dongle.
A new malware strain, dubbed Keydnap, is targeting Mac users, perhaps, in particular, security researchers, according to ESET blog We Live Security.
The ESET researchers are uncertain how victims are initially infected but speculate it might be through attachments in spam messages or downloads from untrusted websites. They have determined that a downloader component is delivered in a .zip file containing an executable with an ordinary-looking extension, .jpg or .txt. But, the file extension includes a space character which, upon double-clicking, will launch it in a Mac Terminal window and not Preview or TextEdit.
Mac OS X keychain password data was exposed by a means of a free tool that requires root access. Dubbed keychaindump, the tool scans for the memory space of the process that handles the keychain function (securityd), trying to find the keychain master key. Migrating to a new Mac. If you're migrating to a new Mac, this is easy. Just connect your Apple ID and enable Keychain syncing with iCloud. Then when you log into your new Mac and connect the same Apple ID, your keychain contents will automatically download and sync across. Exporting from the command line. Migrating to a new Mac. If you're migrating to a new Mac, this is easy. Just connect your Apple ID and enable Keychain syncing with iCloud. Then when you log into your new Mac and connect the same Apple ID, your keychain contents will automatically download.
The malware contains a proof-of-concept sample available on Github, called Keychaindump, that siphons credentials from victims’ Keychain – an Apple component that stores usernames, passwords and other personal information – and opens a backdoor on targeted systems.
After the Keydnap backdoor is installed, while posing as a pop-up, it sets to work digging into rooting privileges and trying to access administrative privileges. It can then download and launch files from a remote URL, thus keeping the backdoor up to date with fresh iterations, while downloading and running Python scripts and loading shell commands.
The ESET researchers have so far detected several variants of the downloader executable. Because some recent samples embed decoy documents that are screenshots of botnet C&C panels or dumps of credit card numbers, they believe the malware is targeting users of underground forums or security researchers.
It is unknown how many Mac users have been affected by this malware campaign, ESET said.
Update: I want to clear up some misconceptions. This is not a security bug in OS X. Everything works as designed. The point of this post was to show a post-exploitation technique and to release a tool for the job. I found this particular technique interesting because it is instantaneous, reliable across OS X versions, and requires no persistent changes in the system.
TL;DR: Root can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users in OS X. Open source proof-of-concept.
There is a design compromise in Apple’s keychain implementation that sacrifices some security for a lot of usability.
As a result, the root user is able to read all keychain secrets of logged-in users, unless they take extra steps to protect themselves. I’m sure Apple is perfectly aware of the security implications, and made the bargain intentionally.
Because this is an intentional design decision instead of a security bug, its exploitation should not come as a surprise. However, I haven’t seen anyone actually use or mention any practical methods before in public.
The situation
In OS X, your keychain contains your saved passwords. This includes all your email accounts in Mail, passwords stored in Safari, and credentials for accessing known Wi-Fi networks. Because it contains valuable secrets, the keychain is encrypted. It can only be opened with your login password.
But there’s a twist. When you log in to OS X, the operating system automatically unlocks your keychain for your convenience. This means that you don’t have to enter your login password every time you want to use your stored passwords.
That’s why, by default, you see keychain dialogs like this
instead of this
Notice that only one of them asks for your password. Most users are probably much happier with the no-password-needed dialog, so that’s what Apple implemented. Of course, this means that it has to be somehow possible to read your keychain passwords even without asking for your login password every time. That’s what “unlocking” means here.
So, your passwords are encrypted to keep them safe, but they have to be readable by OS X itself to keep you happy. That’s a bit of a dilemma. Apple’s solution is threefold.
- Unlocking does not change the keychain file. The plaintext passwords do not appear on disk (or in memory), even when they are unlocked.
- Apple provides an official API for reading unlocked passwords. Even though it does allow you to read them, it also asks for the user’s permission with a dialog window.
- What unlocking actually does or how the unlocked passwords are accessed is not documented. This is security through lack-of-documentation.
The attack
The passwords in a keychain file are encrypted many times over with various different keys. Some of these keys are encrypted using other keys stored in the same file, in a russian-doll fashion. The key that can open the outermost doll and kickstart the whole decryption cascade is derived from the user’s login password using PBKDF2. I’ll call this key the master key.
If anyone wants to read the contents of a keychain file, they have to know either the user’s login password or the master key. This means that
securityd
, the process that handles keychain operations in OS X, has to know at least one of these secrets.I put this observation to the test on my own laptop.
Scanning
securityd
’s whole memory space did not reveal any copies of my login password. Next, I used PBKDF2 with my login password to get my 24-byte master key. Scanning the memory again, a perfect copy of the master key was found in securityd
’s heap.This lead to the next question. If the master keys are indeed stored in
securityd
’s memory, is there a good way to find them? Testing every possible 24-byte sequence of the memory space is not very elegant.Instead of fully inspecting
securityd
’s whole memory space, possible master keys can be pinpointed with a couple of identifying features. They are stored in securityd
’s heap in an area flagged as MALLOC_TINY by vmmap
. In the same area of memory, there’s also always structure pointing to the master key. The structure contains an 8-byte size field with the value of 0x18 (24 in hex) and a pointer to the actual data.Keychaindump For Mac Os
The search is rather simple:
- Find
securityd
’s MALLOC_TINY heap areas withvmmap
- Search each found area for occurrences of 0x0000000000000018
- If the next 8-byte value is a pointer to the current heap area, treat the pointed-to data as a possible master key
With this kind of pattern recognition, the number of possible master keys is reduced to about 20. Each of the candidates can be used to try to decrypt the next key (which I call the wrapping key). Only the real master key should spit out a sensible value for the wrapping key. It’s not a foolproof method, but with the low number of candidates it seems to be good enough. I haven’t run into a single false positive yet.
Keychaindump For Mac Pro
The rest of the decryption process is rather tedious. The master key reveals the wrapping key. A hardcoded obfuscation key reveals the encrypted credential key. The wrapping key reveals the credential key. The credential key finally reveals the plaintext password. All glory to Matt Johnston for his research on these decryption steps.
Here is a sample run and its truncated output, with actual passwords and usernames replaced with x’s.
You can find the source code for keychaindump at GitHub. It’s a proof-of-concept, far from perfect, and it doesn’t list all the possible keychain secrets. But it seems to work okay. I’ve tested it on OS X Lion and Mountain Lion.
Hi! I'm Juuso Salonen, a software developer from Helsinki. You can find me on Twitter and GitHub. I also made Radio Silence, a firewall for Mac. People like it.
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